Introduction
Patents can be a significant barrier to entry into markets for many products. The patent holder has the exclusive right to make, use or sell the claimed invention, and the costs for entrants to invent around, license, or fight legal disputes relating to a patent can be substantial. However, evidence on the role of patents in shaping incumbent/entrant competition is mixed. Some case studies such as GE in electric lamps (Bright 1949 ), Pilkington's float glass process (Yao 1997) or Xerox in the late 1970s (Bresnahan 1985) have identified patents as a powerful mechanism for protecting innovators from competition. However, the experience of other industries such as the "diaper wars" of the 1970s and 80s, or coronary stents in the 1990s, shows that even where a pioneer firm has patent protection for its product, competitors can rapidly enter the market with very similar products and win significant share. More broadly, survey research reporting the experience of practicing managers has shown that the power of patents to block imitation by competitors is generally perceived as imperfect, and is surprisingly weak in many industries (Mansfield et al. (1981) , Levin et al. (1987) , Cohen et al. (2000) ).
Many firms nonetheless acquire large portfolios of patents, and even where the primary motivation for doing this goes beyond the potential to exclude competitors, the impact of an accumulated patent "thicket" on entry costs may be substantial. In this paper we examine the effect of patent holdings in a set of narrowly defined software markets on rates of entry into those markets, and find a significant negative effect. Even after controlling for factors affecting entry such as demand, market structure, and technological opportunity, any association between patents and entry is, of course, difficult to interpret causally. In particular, incumbents' decisions to acquire patents may be endogenous to the threat of entry.
In this context, however, we are able to take advantage of a series of important changes in the legal regime governing software patents that clarified patentability of different types of software inventions, and resolved uncertainty about the enforceability of issued patents. These shocks to the strength of patents in different markets let use an approach inspired by the "differences-in-differences" methodology to identify the increase in the deterrent effect of patents that took place with the expansion of software patentability.
Our estimation results suggest an economically substantial effect: holding constant the quality of issued patents and other market characteristics, a 1% increase in the number of patents is associated with a 0.8% decline in the number of entrants into a market, and in firm-level models this effect is between -0.3% and -0.8%. The negative impact of patent thickets appears to be particularly strong for de novo entrants and firms without experience in other software markets. But, importantly, these negative effects on entry are mitigated when entrants come to market with their own patents: firms that have filed applications for patents relevant to a market are approximately twice as likely to enter as otherwise similar firms.
While much of the literature has focused on patents as an indicator of innovation success, technological opportunity, or innovative capabilities, finding a positive correlation between firms' patent holdings and entry, these findings re-emphasize the role of patents as barriers to entry. They also suggest a powerful motivation for potential entrants to invest scarce resources to obtain their own patents, and point to an increasingly important strategic role for patents in this industry. As all industry participants have responded to increased incentives to obtain patents, the "thicket" in these markets has grown dramatically, imposing greater and greater transactions costs on all firms. This suggests an enhanced role for strategic use of collaborative arrangements such as patent pooling and cross-licensing that can reduce the negative effects of thickets, opportunities to realize profits through creating organizations that can internalize such costs, and performance penalties for firms that fail to develop capabilities for responding to these challenges.
Literature Review
The empirical literature on entry has focused on the roles of four main factors in influencing entry: demand, competition, technological capabilities, and entry costs. 1 Our focus here is on the latter:
whether differences across software markets in the extent of patenting are associated with differences in rates of entry. The classic view of the role of patents in incumbent/entrant competition can be found in Porter (1980) , who postulates the importance of patents as a barrier to entry and source of competitive advantage for incumbents but does not quantify this effect. Large scale statistical studies of PIMS or COMPUSTAT data have found patents to be associated with higher market shares (Robinson 1988) or market/book ratios (Cockburn and Griliches (1988) , Hall (1993) ), but it has proven difficult to distinguish the pure property right/exclusion aspect of patents from their role as indicators of innovative success.
Research in the strategy literature seeking to understand the entry process has largely focused on patents as indicators of entrants' technological capabilities, knowledge assets, or innovation success, rather than as barriers to entry. Helfat and Lieberman (2002) , for example, emphasize the importance of matching firm's pre-entry resources and capabilities to the requirements of the target market, with diversifying entrants seeking economies of scope by matching their pre-entry resources and capabilities with the "required resource profile of the industry". Silverman (1999) explains corporate diversification as a function of firms' technological resources, which are measured using patents mapped to four-digit SIC codes. In a similar vein, de Figueiredo and Kyle (2001) find that laser printer firms with more patents are more likely to enter new markets, Nerkar and Roberts (2004) use patents to provide information on a firm's technological resources in modeling the success of new product introductions in pharmaceuticals, and Henderson and Cockburn (1994) and Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern (2004) use patents to measure accumulated knowledge capital and technological capabilities in pharmaceutical firms.
Patents play a more significant "property rights" role in the models of Teece (1986) , and Gans and Stern (2003) , who emphasize the critical role of access to co-specialized assets which are complementary to IP when entering new markets. Related work such as Gans, Hsu, Stern (2002) and Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2001) generally characterize patents as facilitating transactions in technology as an alternative to entry by innovators.
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The traditional view of patents as a stimulus to innovation has been complicated in recent years by concerns over the extent to which the increasing strategic use of patents, and the general strengthening and expansion of patent rights may be stifling innovation. 3 The public policy debate on patents has been loudest in industries such as semiconductors, electronics, and software that are characterized by complex and cumulative innovation, and where the nature of technology and the fragmentation of patent rights pose unusually difficult challenges. In such circumstances, research suggests that patents are primarily used for strategic purposes, such as for use in cross-licensing negotiations or to deter litigation, rather than directly for preventing imitation (Cohen et al., 2000) . Hall and Ziedonis (2001) highlight the dramatic increase in the strategic use of patents in the semiconductor industry as a response to a pro-patent shift in the U.S. policy in the 1980s. Ziedonis (2004) shows that semiconductor firms patent more aggressively when upstream property rights faced by the firm are held by a larger number of other firms.
In software, some observers have argued that increased use of patents may lead to greater innovation and competition in software (see, for example, Smith and Mann (2004) ). This may happen through familiar mechanisms such as the incentive effect of increased appropriability of returns from R&D. Increased disclosure of useful information in patent documents may also result in greater industrywide R&D productivity compared to a trade secret regime. More subtle mechanisms include the role of patents as a signal of the quality of start-up firms to outside investors or in facilitating contracting with venture capital or other sources of finance (Mann (2005) , Hsu and Ziedonis (2008) ). Patents may permit more efficient transactions in knowledge in a market with explicit property rights. Mann (2005) , for example, argues that patents benefit firms that are able to use them in cross-licensing negotiations.
more likely to survive the collapse of the dot-com bubble after 2001, and Merges (2006) finds evidence that firms have adjusted to the presence of patents, and that effort put into acquiring patents correlates with indicators of market success.
Conversely, Bessen and Hunt (2007) show that software patents are negatively correlated with R&D intensity at the firm level. Hall and MacGarvie (2006) find that legal decisions expanding software patentability were viewed negatively by the stock market and that the marginal software patent makes little contribution to market value. In a study closely related to the current paper, Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) find that software start-ups operating in markets with more patents saw their initial round of funding delayed relative to firms in less thicketed markets. Note that few of these studies suggest an absolute decline in innovation. Instead, they suggest that the costs associated with patenting may be reducing innovation below potential.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis combines data on market conditions, firm characteristics, and entry with data on the "patent landscape" relevant to a market. We measure entry using data on firms' activity in various categories of software reported in an extract of the CorpTech directory of technology companies. This database provides information on 19,306 companies developing or selling software products in the United States between 1990 and 2004, 5 and contains detailed information on the product categories in which each firm is active, as well as information on the founding date of the firm, revenues and employment for many (but not all) of the firms in the dataset, information on corporate parents, funding sources, and a number of other variables. We have matched these firms to other datasets such as SDC to verify and supplement the CorpTech data, as well as to the NBER patent database for information on their patent applications and grants.
For the purposes of this study, markets are defined in terms of the "SOF" code used by CorpTech to categorize software products. SOF codes are a hierarchical classification system used by CorpTech to group products for market research purposes. Firms surveyed by CorpTech self-report the SOF codes in which they are active, which can include products under development as well as products already launched. By tracking when firms are first listed as being active in a SOF code, we are able to identify entrants and incumbents in each market. Specifically, we classify a firm as an entrant if the firm has products in a SOF category after two consecutive sample years (4 years elapsed time) of not having products in that class, or is founded less than two years before its first appearance in the dataset. The companies in our sample consist of organizations listed by CorpTech as having at least one product classification beginning with "SOF", which is CorpTech's code for software. Many of these firms are also active in other, non-software markets. Approximately 80% of the observations for which we have information on the primary SIC code are classified in SIC 73 (prepackaged software). We thank LECG Inc. for facilitating access to these data. 6 Note that CorpTech reports data biannually, with six sample years in the period 1994-2004. We exclude as entrants firms that left the market and then re-entered. Some firms enter CorpTech several years after their founding While CorpTech defines more than 290 fine-grained SOF categories, we focus our analysis on a subset of 27 of these markets that make up the "core" of the database. These markets cover a large share of the software industry: 35% of all the firms in the CorpTech file are active in at least one of these markets. Many of the SOF categories refer to fairly general categories of software or appear to be defined in terms of customer segments rather than in terms of a technology-e.g. "secondary school software,"
"dental practice management software," etc.-or have very low and intermittent levels of activity.
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Furthermore, our analysis also requires a comprehensive mapping of patents to markets, which is a challenging and resource-intensive task. These 27 markets were chosen primarily on the basis of our assessment as to whether the technology/product is reasonably distinctive, and we could define a set of keywords that could be fruitfully searched in the abstract of patent documents. Clearly there is some potential for selection bias to influence our results, however we believe that the criteria used to choose these markets are independent of entry and exit dynamics and this subset does not appear to be markedly different in terms of firm characteristics and entry and exit rates (see the Appendix). However, since these markets are selected on the basis of having sufficiently large numbers of patents and sufficiently distinctive keywords, our findings may not be generalizable to markets in which there are very few patents, or in which inventions are disclosed in unusually general or heterogeneous language.
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The markets that we consider are listed in Table 1 , along with means of the number of market participants and entrants. As can be seen in the Table, markets vary widely in size, as measured by the average number of participants over the sample period, and in the volume of entry. The average market had 156.42 active firms, of which 9.7% were entrants, but these mean values conceal very substantial underlying variation over time and across markets. 9 The smallest market averaged 12.5 firms, while the largest had 588. Overall, there was substantial growth in the number of active firms in this sample:
average market size almost tripled over time, rising from 74.4 firms in 1994 to 201.9 in 2004. There was substantial variation in the mean annual growth rate of individual markets, ranging from 3% per year to over 70%. While the average number of entrants per market per year rose substantially over the sample period, the ratio of entrants to market participants varies widely across markets, between 0 and 60% in dates, and we thus do not observe their entry. However, only a relatively small number of these firms actually enter during the period under consideration (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . We omit SOF codes in which the number of missed entries during the period is more than one standard deviation above the mean. The average number of missed entries across the categories (calculated as the share of firms that are founded after 1990 but do not appear in the sample until more than 2 years after their founding date) amounts to 12.5% of entries, and the standard deviation is 10.08. 7 While it is possible that the effective definition of markets may have changed somewhat over time, affecting counts of market participants, for variation in market definitions to bias our findings any over-or under-inclusion of firms in markets would have to be systematically correlated with our measures of patent thickets. We also control for this possibility in Table 6 , which shows that including market X time effects, as controls for any market-level unobserved heterogeneity that changes over time does not affect the results. 8 Our measurement of entry is therefore contingent on Corptech's definition of markets. Industry boundaries may be fluid, particularly in rapidly changing technologies, and we may therefore be mis-measuring entry. 9 Table A .1 in the Appendix shows annual counts of the number of entrants and number of participants in each market.
some market-years, and fluctuated over time, falling from an average across markets of 19.2% in 1996 to 3.3% in 2002 and then back up to 8.7% in 2004.
We measure the "patent landscape," i.e. the number, characteristics, and ownership of patents relevant to each market at a given point in time, by developing a mapping between patents and markets that matches USPTO patent classifications to the CorpTech SOF categories. This was a complex process, described in detail in the Appendix: in short, we used a combination of text searching and reading the manual of patent classification to identify the set of patent classification codes associated with each market, and then collected information on all patents granted in these classes since 1976 from the NBER database of US patents. After extensive hand-checking (see the appendix) we believe that we capture most, though not all, patents relevant to each market, whether assigned to competitors or noncompetitors. 10 Based on grant dates and expiration dates of each patent we compute the set of patents "in force" that are relevant to a market in a given sample year. The number of patents falling in this set (though not necessarily relevant to a specific product) is one measure of the size of the patent thicket faced by an entrant. As a proxy for bargaining costs associated with patents, we count the number of distinct assignees on the set of patents cited by those patents we have identified as relevant to each market. These measures are depicted in Table 1 (and in greater detail Appendix Table A .2). The number of patents per market averaged 2383.5 over all markets and all sample years, but with significant variation across markets and over time. The least patented market had an average of 16.67 patents in force over the sample period, while the most patented market averaged more than 7400. Significantly for the issues of interest here, the number of patents in each market grew very rapidly over time for all markets, with mean annual growth rates over the period 1993-2004 ranging from 7.9% to 52% (with a mean annual growth rate of 22%).
The average number of cited assignees per market averages 607 with a high of 2738, and a low of 6. Clearly, the average potential entrant is very unlikely to have to obtain licenses to 2383 patents from 607 different entities-only a small fraction of the total number of patents that we have identified as being relevant to a market will be applicable to a specific product. But these figures are consistent with anecdotal evidence that in complex technologies, clearing a product for launch can entail reviewing thousands of patents. 11 As with the number of patents relevant to each market, this measure grew significantly over time in all markets: an entrant to the average market in 2004 would face almost six times as many potential licensors as in 1994.
10 Note that this approach does not identify other potentially relevant patents which are generally applicable to many different software products, or are otherwise usable outside their "industry of origin," facilitated by modular design of software and use of object-oriented programming techniques. But provided these "missing" patents are equally relevant to all 27 SOF categories this will not affect our ability to identify the effect of patents on entry from the cross-section. 11 Based on conversations with various corporate patent counsel.
We hypothesize that entry costs are increasing in the number of patents faced by an entrant.
These costs include the total amount of royalties that would be have to be paid by an entrant if it licensed its way in to the market, R&D expenditures related to inventing around, and a higher probability of having to pay infringement damages. Large numbers of patents also raise costs of performing complete searches of prior art, and increase uncertainty about being sued for patent infringement. While they do not account for other determinants of entry into a market controlled for in subsequent regressions, the summary statistics in Table 2 suggest a significant negative relationship between patent thickets and entry. For each market-year observation, the number of patents per incumbent is calculated and the terciles of the distribution of patents per incumbent in each year are computed. We then calculate the mean number of entrants into market-years falling in each tercile, which falls from around 27 entrants in the least "thicketed" markets to around 7 entrants in the most thicketed. However, because this may reflect market-specific characteristics unrelated to patenting, we also look at the mean within-market change in the number of entrants over each two year period between sample years. Again, we see that markets with the fewest patents per incumbent saw the fastest growth in entry, while those with the most patents per incumbent saw the smallest increase in entry. Finally, we compare the average change in the number of entrants over the two year period prior to a shift in the legal regime governing software patents to that seen in the two years following a regime change. (As discussed below, these regime shifts strengthened patentability at different points in time for different types of software, and provide an identifying source of exogenous variation.) We find that the negative relationship between growth in the number of entrants and patenting rates is most evident following the regime shifts.
Identification
Uncovering the impact of patent thickets on entry with conventional data is difficult for several reasons. One central difficulty stems from the fact that a patent reflects not just a property right over an invention but also the successful outcome of an R&D investment: because technological innovation resulting in a new product is closely related to entry, in equilibrium the raw cross-sectional correlation between the number of patents in the market and the entry rate is likely to be positive. A key challenge in empirically identifying the effects of a proliferation of property rights over a given amount of invention, therefore, is to find a way to hold the invention constant but allow the property rights to vary.
We approach this problem as follows. First, we control for persistent differences across markets in the rate of technological innovation (as well as any other time-invariant factors associated with both patenting and entry) using market fixed effects. Our estimates of the effect of patenting on entry are thus derived from the "within" relationship between changes in patenting and changes in entry over time. To also control for unobserved heterogeneity across markets that evolves over time, we estimate specifications with market fixed effects interacted with a linear or quadratic time trend. Second, we disentangle the property rights effect of patents from patenting that reflects the technological capabilities of firms in the market by distinguishing between the total number of patents relevant to a given market and the average quality of those of patents. We measure the average quality of patents in a market using the mean number of citations received by those patents, which is commonly interpreted as an indicator of patent value or importance. 12 This allows us to isolate the effects of a change in the extent of patenting in a market, holding constant the underlying technological significance or economic value of the innovations covered by those patents.
A second problem with identifying the effect of patents on entry is the potential endogeneity of patent filings. Clearly, it may be difficult to give a causal interpretation to the coefficients of a reducedform regression of entry on patents if the volume of patents reflects an equilibrium response by incumbents reacting to the threat of entry. However there are some institutional aspects of the software industry that suggest that the impact of this potential source of bias is likely to be limited. On the one hand, a significant share of the patents in each market during this period is held by firms other than incumbents, primarily large hardware firms. 13 One the other, the time it takes for a patent application to make its way through the patent office is very long relative to product development cycles in software.
The average pendency period for patents relating to the markets in our sample during the time frame considered here was 2.8 years, with the market with the lowest pendency period averaging 1.4 years and the market with the longest period at 4.8 years. Software development is a very fast-moving process, with typical development cycles measured in months rather than years. Thus, almost all of the patents in force at the time of potential entry will have been filed well in advance of any actual product launch. It should also be noted that any bias created by incumbents filing patents in response to the threat of entry is likely to be positive (that is, biasing the coefficient towards zero).
Recognizing that endogeneity of patenting may nonetheless be an important problem, we look to an independent source of variation in the impact of patents-changes during our sample period in the legal regime governing software patents that progressively clarified and expanded patentability of software inventions. Significantly, these changes affected different markets in our sample at different times. Hall and MacGarvie (2010) provide a detailed description of the legal changes covering software during this period. In summary: prior to 1996, patent protection was generally understood to be limited to software used in manufacturing or otherwise tied to physical processes, as specified by the Supreme Court's Diamond v. Diehr decision of 1981; software more generally was covered after 1996; 14 and 12 Citations are subject to a variety of problems, and may be difficult to interpret directly as evidence of knowledge flow, see Alcacer, Gittelman and Sampat (2009) , but are correlated with market value of patents, probability of being litigated and other indicators of economic value. See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) and Hall, Jaffe and Trajenberg (2005) . 13 Bessen and Hunt argue that only 5% of software patents belong to software publishers. 14 The ground-breaking decision was In re Alappat, issued in 1994, but this "left important questions unanswered" (Durant, 1995) and a series of court cases in 1994 and 1995 led the USPTO to issue definitive and comprehensive financial, business methods software and disembodied algorithms became more clearly patentable after the State Street decision in 1998. This differential evolution in patentability across markets and over time can be seen in the differences in the volume and growth rates of patenting across different patent classes within software during the 1980s and 1990s, with technologies in which the regime change took place earlier seeing earlier increases in the growth of patenting (see Figure 1 in the Appendix).
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This variation provides a useful source of identification. A granted patent in principle represents a right to exclude others from commercializing an invention, but in practice many issued patents may not be upheld in court. 16 This is particularly likely to be the case when standards of patentability are controversial or evolving. Thus, while many firms did file patents covering software inventions and many software patents were indeed granted prior to the expansion of patentability, the validity and enforceability of these patents was uncertain. The regime changes increased the probability that a given software patent would be found valid upon litigation and increased the number of inventions that could be patented. Thus while increases in the number of patents relevant to a market can be expected to reduce entry rates, after a regime shift we expect to see even greater increases in barriers to entry associated with patents and larger reductions in entry rates.
The degree to which these regime changes are an independent source of variation in the strength of patents is, obviously, an important question. Again, institutional features of the software industry are useful. In most of these markets prior to our sample period, many of the patents we have identified as being relevant were held by hardware producers. These firms were active in patent-intensive markets outside software, had developed advanced internal IP-related resources and capabilities, and were therefore likely to have a high propensity to file patent applications in any technology and to seek licensing revenues from potential infringers. In contrast, there is evidence that many software firms did not support the changes in patentability, and had invested very little in patenting their products. At hearings held by the USTPO in 1994, major differences in attitudes towards software patents emerged between these groups of firms 17 and Mann (2007) shows that firms like Adobe, Autodesk, Computer new guidelines on software patentability in 1996 which increased the probability that issued software patents would be held valid (Laurie and Siino, 1995) . 15 While the legal changes we describe are the crucial ones, later developments are worth mentioning. In 1999, Congress established prior user rights to alleged infringers of business methods patents able to prove that they had been commercially exploiting the invention for at least one year before the patent was filed. This change may have slightly reduced the value of business methods patents held by entrants. In 2000, the USPTO began devoting additional review time to business methods applications (the "second pair of eyes" policy) which may have improved the quality of issued patents in that area. The effects of higher-quality patents are controlled for in our regressions by the inclusion of the number of forward citations per patent. 16 Lemley and Shapiro (2005) describe patents as "probabilistic patents" and note that only 0.1% of patents are litigated to trial, and half of litigated patents are found to be invalid. 17 According to one article published in Computer Lawyer in October 1995, at these hearings "most of the large hardware manufacturers (e.g., Apple, AT&T, Digital Equipment, IBM, Intel, Silicon Graphics, and Sun Microsystems) and a few large software companies (e.g., Microsoft and Taligent) generally supported extending patent protection to software inventions. On the other side, several large software companies, including Adobe, Associates and Oracle came late to the software patent game (in terms of applications filed). Arguably, therefore, changes in the strength of software patents during this period were not completely anticipated by many industry participants, 18 and these changes meant that markets in which firms had (for whatever reason) previously filed larger numbers of patents saw exogenous increases in entry barriers compared to otherwise similar markets in which few patents had been filed.
The timing of patent applications and long lags in granting patents also help with identification.
Shifts in the legal regime have an immediate effect on the strength of granted patents and pending applications that predate the regime change, but any increase in applications filed by incumbents in response to the threat of entry would not result in an increase in patents granted until several years after the change. This means that any change in the correlation between patenting and entry over the period immediately following the regime change will not be contaminated by simultaneity bias arising from patents filed in response to the threat of entry. Note also that because these legal changes affected the strength of software patents but did not change the underlying innovation protected by the patent, they further help to distinguish the effects of stronger property rights from the effects of more innovation.
Empirical Approach and Estimation Results
Our regression analysis of the relationship between patents and entry begins with a simple discrete choice model of entry decisions. 19 Firms are assumed to enter markets when expected profits net of entry costs are greater than zero. 20 We estimate a single equation logit discrete hazard model of the form y* it = β'x it + ε it y it =1 if y* it >0, 0 otherwise where x it is a vector of variables capturing costs and benefits of entry and the dependent variable y it equals 1 in the year that the firm enters a market, and 0 before. Firms are dropped from the regression once they have entered a market. Following Berry (1992) and Scott Morton (1999), we begin by treating all the software firms in our sample that have not previously entered a market as potential entrants. The full dataset would have 57,167 firm-year combinations and 27 markets, for a total of 1,543,509
observations. To guard against understating our standard errors, we use the state-based sampling technique advocated by Manski and Lerman (1977) and used by Silverman (1999) in an analogous Autodesk, and Oracle, and many small software developers opposed patent protection for software, as inhibiting the development of new software products." 18 Hall and MacGarvie (2006) find a statistically significant market reaction (measured in terms of Cumulative Abnormal Returns) to the USPTO's 1996 announcement and issuance of new guidelines on software patentability, suggesting this regime shift was not completely foreseen by the market. 19 Our empirical approach is closely related to Greenstein and Wade (1998) , who study entry, exit and the product cycle in the commercial mainframe computer market, as well as to Scott Morton (1999), which analyzes generic entry in pharmaceuticals and Kyle (2006) , which studies international entry patterns in pharmaceuticals. 20 Deciding to enter means that the firm has chosen to commercialize its invention internally. Conversely a decision not to enter may mean either that the firm has chosen to exploit its invention via licensing, or that it has abandoned commercialization entirely.
context, sampling 10% of the non-entrants in each market and 100% of the entrants. 21 Summary statistics from the firm-level database are found in Table 3 , and these show that entrants on average have substantially more patents than non-entrants, are larger, and are more likely to have experience in other markets.
As discussed above, all else equal, we expect entry to be negatively associated with the total number of patents relevant to a market. However these costs may be mitigated if the potential entrant has its own patents: these may improve its position in bargaining over license terms, provide a basis for threatening to counter-sue if an incumbent threatens to try and enforce its patents. An entrant which has its own patents may also have better access to capital markets MacGarvie (2009), Mann (2007) , Hsu and Ziedonis (2008) ), or be anticipating higher profits from a product which is an innovation over existing technologies. All else equal, we therefore expect entry to be positively associated with a potential entrant's own patent holdings. Table 4 presents results. Estimated coefficients are consistent with these core hypotheses: the hazard of entry is substantially lower in markets with more patents, but this effect is somewhat offset for entrants who have their own patents. The estimated hazard ratio for the log of total patents in the market 22 is far below one, while the estimated hazard ratio for the dummy variable for whether the firm holds or has applied for patents relevant to the market) is significantly greater than one. The estimated entry-deterring effect of the number of patents in the market is economically as well as statistically significant: one log unit increase in total patents in the market (about 2/3 of a standard deviation) results in a 50-60% lower hazard of entry, corresponding to an elasticity of about -0.8.
Other explanatory variables are intended to control for demand and market structure (the number of incumbent firms in the market and the number of incumbents squared, plus the growth in revenues in the market over the previous two years, a proxy for the four-firm concentration ratio and its square 23 ), and the stage of the product cycle as captured by a set of dummies for each decile of the modal citation lag of 21 We also experimented with more restrictive definitions of the set of potential entrants, for example by defining potential entrants as those firms that have not previously entered an "adjacent" market (the same broad SOF category, i.e. AI for artificial intelligence). As an alternative, we relax the potential entrants assumption by including presence in an adjacent market as an explanatory variable in the regression. The results were similar to those reported here. 22 This is the total number of patents relevant to the market, as defined by the concordance of patent classes to SOF classes found in the appendix. While these patents are held by a set of firms that certainly includes the incumbent firms in the market, they may also be held by firms that are not active in the market. 23 Unfortunately, we do not have reliable or complete market-level sales data. We create a proxy for this as follows.
For firm i active in in market j as well as n-1 other markets, we compute average sales per market in market j as SALES i /n (the total sales of the firm divided by the number of markets in which it is active). We then add up the average sales per market for all firms active in the market. It is thus important to note that these variables should be viewed as proxies for the true growth and concentration of sales. For example, the CR4 is almost certainly too high due to our inability to perfectly distinguish the market-level sales of a few very large firms from their total sales. For the firms that have missing sales, we interpolate sales as the average firm sales when computing the CR4 so as not to underestimate the total sales in the market.
patents granted in that product market. 24 Time invariant unobserved characteristics of markets are controlled for with market fixed effects. We also perform robustness checks (see Table 6 ) which include market-level fixed effects interacted with linear and quadratic trend variables. These interaction terms control for market-level heterogeneity that changes over time. We control for some observable characteristics of each potential entrant: firm age since founding, a measure of firm size based on a categorical measure of revenues 25 , and prior experience in related markets as captured by the lagged number of "adjacent" or related markets in which the firm is active, and a lagged count of the number of other unrelated markets (outside the broad SOF class) in which the firm operates. 26 Standard errors are clustered by firm to account for potential correlation across observations caused by unobserved firmspecific factors.
As can be seen in Table 4 , after controlling for demand with the growth of revenues, the number of incumbents enters our model with a positive sign, and the number of incumbents squared has a negative coefficient. Both are significant at the 5% level in all specifications. Thus, when the number of firms in the market is small, increases in the size of the market are associated with increases in entrypresumably reflecting a reduction in the market power of incumbents or a reduction of barriers to entry created by network effects. For markets with larger numbers of incumbents, however, increases in the number of incumbents reduce the probability of entry, which could reflect the fact that large numbers of incumbents indicate more mature, more crowded, and less attractive markets. A similar pattern emerges in the coefficients on the four-firm concentration ratio, with a positive coefficient on the linear term and a negative coefficient on the squared term. Our proxy for the growth rate of revenues in a product market is positively and significantly related to the rate of entry. The modal citation lag coefficients (not reported but available upon request) display a pattern in which there is an initial increase in the rate of entry as the modal lag increases, followed by a decrease and then an increase in the coefficient when the modal lag becomes very long. These coefficients are as one would expect given the relationship between the rate of entry and the stage of the product cycle. We find that the probability of entering a given market is increasing in the number of adjacent markets the firm has already entered. Similarly, the number of 24 Because entry and patenting are both likely to be correlated with the stage of the product cycle (Gort and Klepper (1982) document a surge in the rate of patenting in a market in last stage of the product cycle, when entry is low.) This observation is likely to be less relevant in fast-moving technologies with short product lifecycles such as software. Nonetheless, we control for the modal citation lag to patents in the product class as an indicator of the maturity of the technology. For each product class and citing-cited year pair, we compute the citation frequency, or ratio of actual to potential citations (see Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999) ), and then identify the citation lag (citing year -cited year) with the highest citation frequency for a given product class and citing year. 25 This is a set of dummies for each category of revenue: 0 = under $1m; 1 = $1m -$2.5m; 2 = $2.5m -$5m; 3 = $5m -$10m; 4 = $10m -$25m; 5 = $25m -$50m;6 = $50m -$100m; 7 = $100m -$250m; 8 = $250m -$500m; 9 = Over $500m. 26 Here we define other markets in terms of the aggregate SOF categories (e.g. AI: Artificial Intelligence), to reflect the fact that the benefits of experience in a broadly defined area is likely to be common across more detailed product classes.
unrelated markets in which firms have experience is a significant positive predictor of entry (being active in one more of these markets increases the hazard of entry by around 28%). Following Silverman (1999), which includes a measure of the relevance or relatedness of a potential entrant's technological capability to any given market, we distinguish in column (2) between the firm's patents related to a particular market and a dummy for whether the firm ever patents in any market during our sample. 27 The inclusion of the latter dummy helps us to interpret the coefficient on the firm's patents in a particular market as the value of IP related to the market in question, holding constant other firm characteristics correlated with patenting more generally. We observe that, while there is a positive and significant effect of ever patenting at all in any market (which increases the hazard of entry by 23%), the effect of having patents in a particular market is almost three times as important (increases the probability of entry by 124%).
Though not reported here due to space constraints, the effect of the firm's size (revenues) on the probability of entry is concave.
The average quality of patents in the market, as captured by forward citations, has a large and strongly significant negative effect on entry. This effect is distinguishable from the number of patents per se. This result is consistent both with the idea that higher numbers of citations suggest "larger" patents, which are more difficult to invent around, and with the idea that higher numbers of citations reflect more significant past innovation by incumbents-both of which will tend to deter entry. Similarly, the average quality of "own" patents held by potential entrants, as measured by the number of forward citations per patent, is also positively and significantly associated with the rate of entry. This suggests that entrants with higher quality patents may find it easier to bargain their way into the market. A striking finding of this model (as seen in columns 1 and 3) is that entrants' "pipeline" of pending applications is a stronger predictor of entry than the number of granted patents: entry is positively associated with a dummy for having any patent applications and with the ratio of patent applications to grants, but not with cumulative patent grants or a dummy for having patents granted (after controlling for applications).
We also find that, consistent with our expectations, the effects of both the firms' own patents and the number of patents in the market are diminished when a firm is active in other markets. In column (6) we estimate negative and significant coefficient on the firm's patent application dummy interacted with the number of related markets in which the firm has experience. There is also a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of the firm's experience in related markets (markets with the same broad product category definition) and the number of patents in the focal market (market j). These results suggest that the negative effects of incumbents' patents on entry are mitigated when potential entrants have complementary assets (proxied here by experience in other markets), and that having patent applications is significantly more positively related with entry for firms with no experience in related 27 In results not reported in the table, we estimated a positive and significant relationship between Silverman (1999)'s RELTECH measure and the rate of entry.
markets. Similar findings are obtained in column (8) for the interaction terms between firms' and markets' patents and the number of unrelated markets in which the firm operates (markets with a different broad product category).
As discussed above, it may not be just the absolute number of patents in an area that can deter entry, but also the total cost to an entrant of licensing its way through the thicket. One salient feature of patent thickets is the potential for higher costs associated with negotiating with many parties. To the extent that there are fixed costs of conducting a negotiation, having to deal with more parties will drive up costs of obtaining licenses. There may also be transactions costs associated with bargaining and coordinating negotiations with multiple licensors. 28 We calculate the number of different assignees whose patents are cited by patents relevant to the market in question, which can be thought of a proxy for the number of distinct licensors that an entrant would have to negotiate with in order to license its way in to a market. The results in column (4) in Table 4 are consistent with the idea that increases in the potential number of licensors increase entry costs, with a negative and significant estimated coefficient on the number of cited assignees per forward citation in a market. In this regression the count of cited assignees is normalized by the number of forward citations in the market to reduce collinearity among the explanatory variables.
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Endogeneity and regime change results
In Table 4 we address identification of a causal effect of patent thickets on entry using differences-in-differences estimates that exploit the changes in the legal regime affecting patentability of software relevant to different markets discussed above. To take advantage of this source of exogeneity, we estimate the effects of patents on entry in a difference-in-differences type of analysis in column (5) of Table 4 , where we include a dummy variable equal to one in each market following the regime change, and its interaction with the number of patents in the market. 30 The negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term indicates a negative treatment effect of strengthened patent rights on entry. In column (6) we consider three time periods: pre regime-change, the initial period following the regime change, and later years after the regime change. We focus on the change in the coefficient on the 28 See Noel and Schankerman (2006) and Ziedonis (2004) . 29 The resulting variable enters the regression in log form. In alternate versions of this regression, negative coefficients were also obtained on the number of cited assignees, but standard errors were difficult to estimate precisely due to multicollinearity with the number of patents in the market. 30 The precise timing of the regime shift in each market is laid out in Table A .3. We assigned markets to one of three groups. The first group includes software related to manufacturing or tied to physical processes, which should have been considered patentable following Diamond v. Diehr in 1981. This includes automatic teller machine, robotic, quality control, and peripheral device driver software. Another group of markets are those relating to business methods and financial applications, which became patentable following the State Street decision in 1998, which in our sample includes invoicing/billing, tax preparation, inventory management, and order entry/processing software. The remaining markets are considered to have been affected by the USPTO's issuance of new guidelines over software patents in 1995-96, which allowed for software patents as long as they were not embedded in physical media.
market's patents during the period immediately following the regime change, because long administrative delays at the patent office prevent incumbent firms from reacting to the "treatment" by obtaining additional patents. 31 We show that only the immediate effect is significant, indicating that the intensification of the negative effect of patents on entry is restricted to the initial period following the regime change, during which the increase in the number of patents in the market would largely be the result of the processing of applications filed before the regime change. This suggests that the estimated negative effect of patents in the market is not driven by the endogenous response of incumbents filing more patents in reaction to the regime change. The coefficient on the main effect of the patents in the market variable remains negative and significant in all these regressions.
In contrast to the results on the intensification of the entry-deterring effect, we do not observe a statistically significant increase in the impact of firms' own patents on the probability of entry following a regime change. This suggests that the entry-deterring effect of the market's patents intensified once software became more patentable, but the entry-promoting effect did not. If the property-right component of entrants' patents were a significant determinant of entry, this should have become more valuable following a regime change, with a positive estimated coefficient on the interaction term. The fact that there is no significant change in the association between firms' own patents and entry may imply that the estimated main effect is mainly picking up the fact that firms with better technologies are both more likely to patent and more likely to enter markets, rather than the property right effect.
Robustness
The difference-in-differences approach we employ here relies upon the assumption that the legal changes were exogenous, or more precisely, were not driven by other factors that simultaneously changed the relationship between patenting and entry. 32 For example, if some other change took place at around the same time as the legal changes and led to both an increase in the rate of patenting and a decline in the rate of entry, identification of a casual effect of patents on entry will be compromised. But because preregime-change markets are used as a control group, for such a confounding factor to explain our findings, it would have to have affected each of the relevant markets separately at exactly the same time as the legal change. Results are also contingent on the timing and application of the regime shifts to each 31 The length of the period "immediately" following the regime change is determined by the length of the grant lag in the years following the change. As of 2000, the median grant lag in markets affected by the first regime change (in March 1996) averaged 2.8 years, so that a large share of the patents granted up to 2000 were filed before the USPTO issued new guidelines in 1996. By 2004, the median grant lag in markets affected by the State Street decision in July 1998 averaged 3.8 years, and was as long as 4.7 years in billing software. We therefore restrict the period "immediately" following the first regime change to 1998-2000, while the corresponding period after State Street is 2000-2004. 32 It is certainly possible that some firms filed more patents in anticipation of legal changes, which if true, would bias our estimates of the effects of patents on entry towards zero. But note that this effect works against a finding of a significant effect on entry, and as stated previously there is evidence that many software firms (as opposed to hardware firms) did not support the changes in patentability and were late in starting to file large numbers of software patents.
market. As an additional robustness check, we randomly assigned the "regime" dummy to markets while preserving the number of markets that were post-regime change in each year. We find that in such a specification with a random regime variable, the regime X patents coefficient is statistically insignificant.
We also find that the latter interaction is insignificant at the 5% level when we shift the date of the regime change forward or backward in time within each market.
Another important assumption underlying our analysis is the definition of markets used to measure entry and identify relevant patents. We have considered the possibility that technological change could have led some of the markets in our sample to become more fragmented into sub-markets not captured by the CorpTech market definitions at around the same time as our regime changes. If this did indeed happen, we might see declines in observed entry rates (because entry into the submarkets would not necessarily be captured) associated with an increase in patenting that could spuriously generate our regime change findings. But if this effect is responsible for our findings, we would expect to see it primarily in the largest markets or in the markets that saw the biggest declines in concentration, and our results are robust to a variety of specifications that account for this potential fragmentation.
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Another possible omitted variable is the rise of the internet. The growth of internet-related businesses, for example, would be associated with an increase in both the rate of entry and the rate of patenting, which would lead to a positive coefficient on the interaction of the market's patent stock and the rate of entry. We find the opposite -a negative and significant estimated coefficient on this interaction term. Our main regressions and regime change results are similarly robust to dropping the "internet tools" market from the sample. We also experimented with including a dummy variable for markets in which Microsoft was active, and the results were robust to the inclusion of this control.
Endogeneity and patenting by potential entrants
A second source of potential endogeneity in the single-equation discrete-time hazard model is patenting by entrant or potential entrant firms. The positive effect of a firm's own patents on entry may be subject to simultaneity bias if firms' decisions to enter a market and to apply for patents are jointly determined (for example, if there are unobserved differences across firms in R&D productivity that make the most productive firms more likely to patent and enter markets). 34 To correct for this bias, we use a Bivariate Probit (BVP) model, with separate equations for the firm's decision to patent an innovation and to enter the market. This type of model has been used by, for example, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) to model the complementarity between internal R&D and external knowledge acquisition, and allows us to account for the endogenous nature of the firm's patenting decision in the entry equation by allowing for correlation in the errors of the entry and patenting equations.
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The Bivariate Probit model takes the following form: define dummy variables y 1 =1 if the firm enters the market and 0 otherwise, and y 2 = 1 if the firm files a patent and zero otherwise. Let x 1 and x 2 be vectors of variables influencing entry and patenting. We then specify a two-equation model where y* 1 = β 1 'x 1 + ε 1 y 1 =1 if y* 1 >0, 0 otherwise y* 2 = β 2 'x 2 + ε 2 y 2 =1 if y* 2 >0, 0 otherwise
Assuming that the firm decides first whether or not to patent, making patenting costs sunk, we can write this model as a recursive simultaneous equations model in which the joint distribution of y 1 and y 2 is given by:
where Φ 2 is the cdf of the bivariate normal distribution.
36 In this model we use the number of nonsoftware patents previously filed by the firm as an additional identifying instrument for the probability the firm has filed a software patent in year t. This variable instruments for propensity to patent: if a firm has experience navigating the patent system for technologies other than software, that firm should lower costs of obtaining a software patent.
The estimates of the BVP model for various model specifications are contained in Table 5 positive and statistically significant (at the 5% or 10% level, depending on the specification). 35 As Greene (1998) observes, "in the bivariate probit model, unlike in the linear simultaneous equations model, if the two dependent variables are jointly determined, we just put each on the right hand side of the other equation (or, in our case, one of them) and proceed as if there were no simultaneity problem." 36 See Greene (11999) p. 848, and Greene (1998) for an example.
The estimated effect of the number of patents in the market on entrant/potential entrant firms' probability of patenting is positive, though not significant. Consistent with our hypothesis that experience in non-software patenting may lower costs of obtaining software patents, or that firms vary in their propensity to patent, this variable is a strong predictor of patenting, with a t-ratio of 27.13 in the patenting equation corresponding to a first-stage F-statistic of 208.7. However it appears to be uncorrelated with the firm's entry decision except through its effect on propensity to obtain software patents: when the number of the firm's non-software patents are included as an explanatory variable in the entry equation, the point estimate of the effect is essentially zero and is statistically insignificant with a p-value of 0.84.
The effect of the number of patents in the market on the probability of entry is economically significant, and we see a substantial difference between firms that patent and those that do not. A one percent increase in the number of patents in the market is associated with a 0.34% decrease in the probability that a firm has patents and enters the market (Pr (y 1 =1, y 2 =1)). Meanwhile, the elasticity of the probability that the firm has no patents and enters the market (Pr(y 1 =1, y 2 =0)) with respect to the number of patents in the market is -0.84.
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In addition to using the instrumental variable to control for endogeneity of own patenting, we address potential endogeneity of incumbents' patenting in the entry equation, using the same differencesin-differences approach as in Table 4 . As can be seen in the estimates reported for the models in columns (5) and (6), and (7) and (8), very similar results are obtained.
While we believe that these firm-level estimates, where we can control to some degree for firmspecific characteristics and directly measure decisions not to enter, are most helpful for understanding the determinants of the firm's entry decision, we have also estimated an aggregate market-level model of entry rates. Table 6 presents results. The specification of these regressions are essentially the same as in Table 4 , however because the dependent variable is a count we use a Poisson regression model with market fixed effects and robust standard errors is used to estimate the parameters.
38 Consistent with the firm-level results, we find a negative and significant relationship between the log of the number of patents in the market and the rate of entry. The estimates from the market-level model generally confirm those of the firm-level model, and we include several additional robustness 37 The magnitude of the effect of own patents on entry estimated using instrumental variables should be interpreted carefully. As shown by Angrist and Imbens (1995) , the estimates obtained from instrumental variables are informative about the effect of the "treatment" only on firms induced to patent software by their history of nonsoftware patenting. If the marginal firms induced to patent by their history of patenting non-software are those valuing patents less highly, while the firms patenting software independent of their patenting histories value patents highly, our instrumented estimates may in fact underestimate the effect of firms' patents on entry. 38 Wooldridge (2002) explains that if the underlying distribution is truly Negative Binomial, the Negative Binomial estimator is more efficient than the Poisson, but if the distributional assumption is wrong, the Poisson is still consistent as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified. In practice, we found that there was essentially no difference between results obtained using a fixed-effects Negative Binomial model and those obtained from the Poisson model. The former are available upon request.
checks. First of all, we show in columns (3) and (4) that the main result is robust to the inclusion of a linear trend interacted market-level fixed effects (or a quadratic trend interacted with these effects).
Columns 5 and 6 examine the impact of legal changes in patentability on the entry-deterring effects of patents. We find that for entrants as a whole, the relationship between the number of patents in the market and the rate of entry is exacerbated (with a significant coefficient of -0.10 on the interaction of the market's patent stock and the regime change dummy). 39 For de novo entrants (which we define as firms younger than 10 years old 40 who specialize in one aggregate SOF class -e.g. AI: artificial intelligence), the effect is stronger-the coefficient on the interaction between market's patent stock and the regime shift dummy is -0.32 and significant at the 1% level in column 7. This suggests that the strengthening of IP rights in software led to a more substantial intensification of the entry-deterring effect of patents for young, specialized firms than for established companies.
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The magnitudes of the coefficients described in this paper should be interpreted carefully.
Holding constant average patent quality, a 1% increase in patents is associated with approximately a 0.8% decline in entry, which may seem a surprisingly large effect. Note however that the "pure" property rights effect associated with strengthening of software patents is much smaller: the interaction of patents with regime change adds only -0.1 to the main effect of patents in the market. Interpreting this as an estimate of the effect of going from no patent protection over software to strong patent protection, the deterrent effect on entry is rather small. However, if one views the regime changes as a mild increase in the strength of patents, the deterrent effect appears larger. Thus, this coefficient remains somewhat open to interpretation.
Secondly, it is important to think about whether an increase in patenting holding constant forward citations per patent (patent quality) is a likely real-world outcome. In our data, we observe a negative correlation between the number of patents in the market and the average number of forward citations received by these patents. This is partly due to a truncation effect (controlled for by the inclusion of year effects in our regressions), but it may also reflect the issuance of larger numbers of relatively less important patents in some markets. Note that if we assume that the number of forward citations per patents falls as the number of patents granted grows, the magnitude of the effect of patents on entry is lower. Under this interpretation, "frivolous" or purely strategic patents without much technological value are not predicted to have as significant an effect on entry.
39 When we drop citations per patent from the regression, the coefficient on the number of patents in the market is -0.2 (s.e. of 0.11) and the regime X patents coefficient is -0.12 (s.e. of 0.05). Thus, without holding constant patent quality, the effects of patents pre-regime change are substantially smaller, but the post-regime change effect is similar. 40 We measure firm age as the time elapsed since the founding date reported in Corptech. 11% of the entrants in the sample meet this criteria. 41 GMM estimation of the market-level regressions using the models suggested by Chamberlain (1992) and Wooldridge (1997), or Blundell, Griffith and Windmeijer (2002) , gave similar coefficients.
Discussion and Conclusions
Patents appear to have a significant effect on competition and entrant/incumbent interaction in software markets. In this context, where patents are thought to be particularly problematic in creating transactions costs, we estimate substantial elasticities of entry with respect to patents held by incumbents and non-competitors in the range of -0.3 to -0.8. Because patents are both a property right that allows patent holders to exclude competitors, and an indicator of technological capabilities, it can be difficult to interpret a negative association between patents and entry: are entry rates lower because the incumbents' patents raise entry costs, or because incumbents are out-innovating entrants? Here we use exogenous changes in the legal regime governing software patents, along with a control for the quality of incumbents' patents, to identify a distinct and significant "property rights" effect. Interestingly, the deterrant effect of patents is substantially less negative when entrants arrive at the market with their own patents. Where we explicitly model firms' joint decisions to obtain their own patents and to enter the market, we find an almost three times larger negative effect of existing patents on entry when entrants lack patents.
We also find that patents appear to be substitutes for complementary assets and capabilities in determining entry: the estimated value of entrants' own patent holdings in the entry process is lower for those firms that have prior experience entering other markets, and patent thickets matter less for firms with experience. While this result is difficult to interpret definitively without much finer detail on firms'
products and entry strategies than we have been able to collect, it highlights the significance of cospecialized complementary assets for competition in knowledge-intensive industries.
Patent thickets, at least as measured here, thus appear to substantially raise entry costs. This is not to say that the overall effect of strengthening software patents was necessarily negative, at least in an absolute sense. The markets in our sample saw substantial overall growth in sales and in the number of participants during this period. Any negative impact of patent thickets on entry is felt as forgone potential for even higher rates of entry, and this may be mitigated by the stimulating effects of stronger patent protection. As discussed above, strengthening or clarifying property rights has potential benefits as well as costs, and we estimate a positive and significant main effect of regime changes on entry, all else equal.
But transactions costs associated with thickets may have interesting dynamic effects: while incumbents enjoy increased protection for current innovations, larger thickets will also raise their costs of introducing future generations of innovations. With both entrants and incumbents facing strong incentives to acquire patents, which in turn contribute to even larger thickets and higher associated transactions costs, all market participants can become negatively affected. These dynamics may underlie opportunities emerging for new organizational forms and business models that eliminate (or arbitrage) transactions costs associated with patent thickets. Some privately funded entities have begun to assemble large portfolios of software patents, with the apparent intent to sell access at a single "one-stop shopping" price that reflects internalization of transactions costs. Other software producers are side-stepping the whole problem by operating in the open source world.
A striking finding is that, while firms holding patents related to a market are much more likely to enter it, relatively few of the entrant firms in our sample came to market with patents-and only a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Robust standard errors (clustered by market) in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
